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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1896 decision, Plessy v. Ferguson,' the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that African-Americans could be segregated in public
accommodations without violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as long as the separate facilities for blacks were equal to those
provided for whites.2 Plessy was decided at the end of the Reconstruction
era when lynching, violence, and other forms of intimidation were used to
impose a regime of white supremacy. The decision provided the legal
rationale for the new racial order. By the beginning of the twentieth

* Louis L. Redding Professor of Law & Public Policy, University of Delaware. This Article
is based, in part, on discussions that appear in EducationalEquity and Brown v. Board of
Education: 50 years of School Desegregation in Delaware, 47 How. L.J. 299 (2004).
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. Id. at 552.
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century, the equality rights established by the Fourteenth Amendment
were, for all practical purposes, nullified in the former Confederate states.
In other regions of the nation, public policy and private practices excluded
African-Americans from schools, neighborhoods, public accommodations,
and all but the most menial occupations.
African-Americans did not acquiesce to these conditions. Shortly after
the turn of the century, several organizations were established to promote
racial mobility, including the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP).3 In the early 1930s, the NAACP's attorneys
devised what became known as the "equalization strategy."4 This involved
filing cases in southern states, demanding the upgrade of schools
established for African-American students to make them equal to those
reserved for whites. The campaign was premised on the theory that states
maintaining schools could not afford dual educational systems that were
actually equal and segregation would eventually collapse under its own
weight. The first "equalization strategy" case was filed in the mid-1930s.
By the early 1950s, when the final equalization cases were decided,
Plessy 's separate but equal rationale had been completely viserated. It was
then that the coordinated attack was launched in the six cases that are
collectively remembered as Brown v. Boardof Education.5
Brown has long been viewed almost entirely as the product of a
progressive U.S. Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, yet this characterization is misleading. The NAACP's litigation
campaign - carefully planned and executed strategy occurring over more
than two decades via dozens of cases 6 - compelled a reluctant and often
recalcitrantjudiciary to abandon the legal fiction on which segregation was
premised. Without the NAACP's efforts, Brown could not have happened.
This article analyzes the development of the legal strategy that led to
Brown. It also examines the fierce resistance to the implementation of
Brown's mandate. It concludes with a discussion of the trend toward
resegregation and the failure, thus far, to realize Brown's promise of racial
equality.

3. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Timeline, at
http://www.naacp.org/about/about-history. html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
4. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Legal Affairs History
[hereinafter Legal Affairs History], at http://www.naacp.org/departments/legal/ legalhistory.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
5. 347 U.S. 483,486 (1954).
6. Legal Affairs History, supra note 4.
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II. THE LEGAL STRATEGY
During the Reconstruction era following the Civil War, three
Constitutional Amendments of paramount importance to AfricanAmericans were enacted: the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery;7
the Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to the individuals who had
been enslaved prior to the War and guaranteed them equal protection of
the laws;' and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from interfering
with voting rights.9 For the next few years, African-Americans progressed
rapidly. For example, they established households, built schools, and
developed business enterprises. African-Americans also assumed
leadership roles in their communities. They were elected to offices at the
local, state, and national levels.'"
However, after the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877,1 a new order
was imposed. Lynching, violence, and other forms of intimidation were
used to impose white supremacy. The new order received legal sanction
with the 1896 decision of Plessy v. Ferguson12 through the establishment
of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Plessy involved a challenge to a New
Orleans ordinance requiring segregation on public transportation
systems. 13 As Justice Harlan's dissent made clear, the law's equality
assertion was completely disingenuous. "Everyone [knew] that the statute
in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white
persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks as to exclude colored people
from the coaches occupied by or assigned to white people."' 4
In the years that followed, an imposed system of racial segregation
governed virtually all aspects of the lives of African-Americans;
restricting, among other things, where they could live, work, and attend
school. Conditions for African-Americans were always separate from, but
never equal to, their white counterparts.
In the early 1930s, the NAACP received a $100,000 grant from a
philanthropic organization, which it earmarked for a legal campaign to
attack segregation laws. Walter White, the newly appointed executive

7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
10. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The Long Shadow of Jim
Crow: Voter Intimidation and Suppression in America Today [hereinafter The Long Shadow],
available at http://www.naacp.org/inc/pdf/jimcrow.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
11. Id.
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. Id.at 540.
14. Id. at 557.
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director of the NAACP, hired legal consultant Nathan Margold to prepare
a comprehensive analysis of the segregation laws and to develop
recommendations on how to challenge them in the courts. 5 Margold later
submitted a comprehensive report, concluding that segregation as
practiced, did not comply with the separate but equal principle of Plessy.6
The facilities that were provided for African-Americans were never equal
to those reserved for whites. One of the many examples of the disparities
concerned the deplorable conditions of public schools. Educational
resources for black students were, by every objective measure, inferior to
those maintained for whites.' 7 To remedy this, Margold recommended a
series of taxpayer suits against the jurisdictions that practiced
segregation. 8
In 1935 the NAACP hired the Dean of Howard University's law
school, Charles H. Houston, to launch the litigation program.' 9 A brilliant
visionary, Houston joined the Howard faculty not long after graduating
from Harvard Law School, where he was the first African-American to
serve on the Law Review.2" In the early 1930s, Houston transformed
Howard from a marginal night school to a fully accredited academic
institution that became the laboratory for civil rights litigation. He also
trained a generation of African-American lawyers who led the civil rights
litigation revolution.2"
Houston agreed with Margold's analysis but disagreed with the
recommended strategy of taxpayer suits. Concerned that a premature
challenge to Plessy might result in a Supreme Court decision reaffirming
the separate but equal principle, Houston suggested an indirect approach,
the "equalization strategy."22 Under this approach, the NAACP would file
cases arguing that the southern states practicing segregation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by providing inferior facilities for blacks.23
Houston also recommended that the litigation focus on graduate and
15. Leland Ware, Setting the Stagefor Brown: The Development andImplementation of the
NAA CP'sSchool DesegregationCampaign, 1930-1950, 52 MERCER L. REV. 631 (2001).
16. Legal Affairs History, supranote 4.
17. See, e.g., JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH 148-237
(1988).
18. MargoldReport,Papers of the NAACP, Part 3: The Campaign for Educational Equality,
1913, 1950, Series A. Reel 4, Frames 560-772.
19. GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983); GERALDINE R. SEGAL, IN ANY FIGHT SOME FALL (1975).
20. MCNEIL, supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id.at 134-37; see also Robert Carter, In Tribute: CharlesHamiltonHouston, 111 HARv.
L. REV. 2149, 2152 (1998).
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professional schools where the southern states were most vulnerable. The
majority of them had established segregated colleges, but none provided
any graduate or professional training for black students.
Houston believed enforcing the equality aspect of the separate but
equal doctrine would compel states that operated dual systems to provide
educational facilities for black students that were physically and otherwise
equal to those maintained for whites. Southern states could not bear the
economic burdens of such a system. Thus, under the pressure of litigation,
segregation would eventually be abandoned. 24 The NAACP Board of
Directors approved Houston's recommended "equaliziation strategy," and
the attack was launched by one attorney with a $10,000 budget.25

III. THE EQUALIZATION CASES

Houston and his former student, Thurgood Marshall, 6 handled the first
"equalization" case, Pearsonv. Murray.27 Donald Gaines Murray applied
for admission to the University of Maryland's law school and the
application was denied solely on the basis of Murray's race.28 Murray filed
a lawsuit in a Maryland state court challenging the university's decision.
When the case went to trial, Houston and Marshall presented evidence that
proved that the facilities for black students at Maryland's Princess Anne
Academy were not equal to those at the University's main campus.
Maryland and other southern states had established a scholarship fund
for black students to help with the costs of attending graduate schools in
other states.29 Maryland argued that the scholarship fund satisfied the
24. See generally ROBERT COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE,
CULTURE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICAS STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975); MARK
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT 19361961 (1994); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); JAMES K. PATTERSON, BROWN VS.
BOARD OFEDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001); PETER H.
IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION (2002).
25. Ware, supra note 15, at 641.
26. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998); see
also CARL ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS DREAMS BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD
MARSHALL 46 (1994); HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACISM INAMERICA (1998); MICHAEL DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 48 (1992); ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID
GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 25 (1992).
27. 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
28. Id. at 590.
29. Id. at 591.
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state's obligation under Plessy to provide equal educational opportunities
for African-American students.30 During their examinations of state
officials, Houston and Marshall demonstrated that the funds were
inadequate to satisfy the educational expenses of the many black students
desiring graduate training. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge issued
a ruling from the bench ordering the university to admit Murray to the law
school's entering class the following semester. The Maryland Supreme
Court affirmed that decision. 3
After the Murray decision, a case was filed challenging segregation at
the University of Missouri.32 Lloyd Gaines, a 1935 graduate of Lincoln
University in Missouri, applied for admission to the University of
Missouri's law school. 33 After the university denied his application,
Houston and a Missouri attorney, Sidney Redmond, filed suit against the
university in state court.34 Relying on Murray, they argued that Missouri
was obligated to offer legal training to black students as it did for whites.35
The Missouri courts ruled against Gaines. 36 The Missouri Supreme
Court held that the out-of-state scholarships available to African-American
students satisfied Missouri's constitutional obligations underPlessy.37 The
NAACP appealed this ruling and subsequently secured its first U.S.
Supreme Court victory in a desegregation case.38 The majority of the Court
found that the right to equal protection was a "personal one" 39 that could
not be satisfied with out-of-state scholarships.' The Court held that
Missouri had a constitutional duty to provide legal training to AfricanAmerican students within its borders.4 ' The Court reasoned that shifting
the responsibility to another state would circumvent that obligation.42
Thus, the Court ordered Gaines' admission.43

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Murray, 182 A. at 590.
See Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1938).
MCNEIL, supra note 19, at 127.
Id.
See id.at 128.
Gaines, 113 S.W.2d at 791.
Id.
See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Id. at 351.
Id. at 349-52.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 349-52.
Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352.
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After the Gaines decision in 1938, the NAACP filed a series of teacher
salary cases to eliminate racial disparities in compensation." Black
teachers were routinely paid far less than their white counterparts for the
same work. These cases were successful and solidified support for the
organization in the communities where the cases were filed. With the
outbreak of World War II in 1941, the NAACP's attention was diverted to
other matters, such as defending the rights of African-Americans serving
in the military. After the conclusion of the War, however, the focus
returned to education, which was fueled by an unprecedented demand for
higher education. Thousands of returning soldiers, including AfricanAmericans, enrolled in colleges and universities with the aid of G.I.
benefits that underwrote tuition costs.
IV. THE POST-WAR GRADUATE SCHOOL CASES

The first post-war case was filed in Oklahoma. In 1946, the NAACP
filed a civil action on behalf of Ada Louise Sipuel against the University
of Oklahoma, challenging its policy of excluding African-American
students.45 Thurgood Marshall, who had succeeded Houston as the
NAACP's legal director, argued that Oklahoma was obligated to provide
legal training to African-American students.' After losing at the trial court
level,47 Marshall appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.48 The
Court held that Oklahoma was obligated to provide legal instruction to
black students.4 9 State officials responded by renting three rooms in a
building across the street from the state capital, hiring some professors,
and designating this arrangement the "Negro" law school.50 The Supreme
Court declined the NAACP's challenge to Oklahoma's actions.5 '
Another case was filed in Texas by Heman Marion Sweatt, a postal
worker who applied for admission to the University of Texas' law school
at Austin.5 2 After the university denied Sweatt's application, the NAACP
filed suit on his behalf.53 While the case was pending, Texas, following
44.

MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP' s LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION

77 (1987).
45. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632 (1948).
46. Id. at 637.
47. Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 180 P.2d 135, 144 (Okla. 1947).
48. Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 632.
49. Id. at 632-33.
50. Id.
51. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 150 (1948).
52. Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. 1948).
53. Id.
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Oklahoma's example, established a "Negro" law school in Houston by
renting a few rooms and hiring lawyers to serve as professors.54 The trial
court ruled against Sweatt.55 While the appeal was pending, the Texas
legislature appropriated $100,000 to build a separate law school for
African-Americans
that was intended to be comparable to the Austin
56
facility.
As Sweatt worked its way through the lower courts,57 the NAACP filed
another case in Oklahoma.58 The plaintiff, George W. McLaurin, was a 68year-old professor at Oklahoma's black college who applied for admission
to the graduate school of education at the University of Oklahoma.59
Instead of renting rooms and hiring a small staff, as they had done in
reaction to the Sipuel decision, university officials allowed McLaurin to
attend classes with white students but he was required to sit in an alcove
behind a sign that read "colored., 60 He was directed to sit at a separate
table in the balcony of the library, to eat his lunch at a different time from
the other students, and to sit at a separate table in the dining room. 6' The
lower court ruled against the NAACP.62
Sweatt and McLaurin were appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The
cases were argued consecutively, and the rulings were issued together in
1950.63 In Sweatt, the Court held that physical equality was not enough. 6
The Court said education involved more than bricks and mortar.65 Certain
intangible features, such as prestige, reputation, and the exchange of ideas,
were critical in educational settings and could not be replicated at a
66
segregated law school.
McLaurin involved internal segregation. McLaurin attended the same
classes and listened to the same lectures as white students, but on a
segregated basis. 67 The Court found that the arrangement stigmatized
McLaurin and handicapped him in his efforts to pursue an education.68 In
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950).
Sweatt, 210 S.W.2d at 443.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 443.
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950).
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 638 (1950); McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638.
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635-36.
McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 641.

BROWN AT50: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO RESEGREGATION

2005]

275

both Sweatt and McLaurin, the U.S. Supreme Court finally recognized the
stigmatic and other psychological69 injuries created by segregation, but
stopped short of reversing Plessy.
V. THE BROWN CASES
After the decisions in Sweatt and McLaurin, the NAACP attorneys
decided the foundation for a challenge to Plessy had been established and
a direct attack was launched. The school desegregation cases consisted of
six consolidated challenges involving five separate jurisdictions: Brown
7
7
v. Topeka Board of Education ' arose in Kansas; Briggs v. Elliott '
involved schools in South Carolina; Davis v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County challenged segregation in Virginia;7 2 Bolling v.
Sharpe73 was filed in the District of Columbia challenging segregation in
Virgina; and there were two Delaware cases - Belton v. Gebhart and
Bulah v. Gebhart.74
Under a procedure that allowed a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, a special three-judge panel heard the trial in the South Carolina
case, Briggs v. Elliott.75 At the outset of the proceedings, the attorneys for
South Carolina conceded that the black schools were inferior, but argued
that they would soon be equalized.76 The NAACP's attorneys responded
that the state's concession was irrelevant because the challenge was
against segregation rather than unequal conditions. 77 During the trial,
Marshall, the NAACP's legal director, called witnesses who established
two key points: that the black schools were physically unequal7" and that
segregation inflicted severe psychological damage on black students.7 9 On
June 23, 1952, relying on Plessy,the Court ruled that segregation in public
schools was permissible as long as the facilities provided were equal.8 0 The
Court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to an order declaring the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635; McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D. S.C. 1955).
Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (1952).
347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 863 (Del. Ch. 1952).
98 F. Supp. 529, 531 (E.D. S.C. 1951).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 547-48.
Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 532.
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state's obligation to equalize its schools but they could not prevail on the
challenge to segregation itself.8' That decision was appealed.
While Briggs was proceeding at the trial stage, another controversy was
brewing in Virginia, which culminated in Davis County School Boardof
Prince Edward County.82 In April 1952, a group of black students who
attended a high school in Prince Edward County, Virginia, organized a
strike to protest the deplorable condition of their school.83 They eventually
contacted the NAACP.' Richmond-based NAACP attorneys, Oliver Hill
and Spottswood Robinson, responded to the students' plea for assistance.85
The students wanted the school board to construct a new building.86 Hill
and Robinson agreed to help them if the students agreed to serve as
plaintiffs in a lawsuit seeking to desegregate, rather than equalize, the
County's schools.87 The NAACP filed a lawsuit that proceeded similarly
to Briggs.88 Like in Briggs, experts in the Davis trial testified about the
poor physical condition of the black high school and psychologists
described the detrimental effect that segregation had on black students.89
In Davis, a three-judge panel found that controlling legal precedent
amply supported segregated schools.9" It further stated that segregation
was a way of life in Virginia. The district court reasoned that "[s]eparation
of white and colored children in the public schools of Virginia has for
generations been part of the mores of her people. To have separate schools
has been their use and wont."9
The District of Columbia case, Boiling v. Sharpe,92 was filed on behalf
of a group of black parents led by Gardner Bishop, a Washington, D.C.
barber. Like the plaintiffs in Davis,the plaintiffs in Boiling initially sought
to equalize the public school facilities in Washington. Charles Houston
agreed to represent them. By the time the case began, Houston's health
was failing, so he persuaded the group to ask James Nabrit to represent
them. Nabrit undertook the group's representation after he convinced the
81. Id.at 538.
82. See Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va.

1952).
83.
NAACP,
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Kara M. Turner, Both Victories and Victims: Prince Edward County, Virginia, The
and Brown, 90 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1669 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1669-70.
Davis, 103 F. Supp. at 338-39.
Id.at 339.
Id. at 339-40.
Id.

92. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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group to challenge segregation directly. Boiling differed from the other
cases in one significant aspect: As a federal territory, the District of
Columbia was not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies
only to state actions. All of the other cases challenged segregation as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Bolling, however, the legal challenge alleged violations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In 1948, the Topeka, Kansas, branch of the NAACP petitioned the local
school board to desegregate the public schools. After two years of
inaction, the group contacted the NAACP's headquarters in New York and
requested assistance in filing a lawsuit.
There were several plaintiffs in Brown v. Boardof Education, but in
what reflected the prevailing views of gender, the group felt that a male
should be the lead plaintiff. As a result, Oliver Brown is one of the bestknown names in twentieth century legal history. On February 14, 1951,
Brown93 was filed in the federal district court in Kansas.
The racial disparities in Topeka's schools were not as extreme as they
were in other locations. For tactical reasons, Robert Carter and the other
NAACP attorneys chose not to focus on physical comparisons. They relied
almost entirely on evidence relating to the psychological injuries that
segregation inflicted on black students. As a consequence, the district court
ruled that the qualifications of the teachers and the quality of instruction
available at the black schools in Topeka were not inferior to what was
provided to white students.94 However, the district court went on to rule
that:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has a sanction of law, for the policy of separating the races
is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.
A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
restrain the education and mental development of Negro children
and to deprive them of the benefits they would receive in a racially
integrated school system. 95
Despite this important factual finding, the district court concluded it
was bound by Plessy's separate but equal doctrine to rule against the

93. 98 F. Supp. 797 (1951).
94. Id. at 798.
95. Id.
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plaintiffs.96 However, the decision was structured in a way that virtually
invited the U.S. Supreme Court to re-examine Plessy.
Finally, the two cases in Delaware which were combined in one case
were Belton v. Gebhart97 and Bulah v. Gebhart. In 1950, Howard High
School was the only public high school in the entire state of Delaware for
black students, and it was located in a black neighborhood in
Wilmington.98 Its aging physical plant stood in marked contrast to the
modem, well-equipped white high school in Claymont.99 In Hockessin, a
rural village not far from Wilmington, Sarah Bulah was required to drive
her adopted child past the white students' school to a dilapidated, oneroom schoolhouse that served black children.
Belton and Bulah were originally filed in federal court but the Attorney
General had them removed to state court. Thus, the cases were heard by
Collins Seitz, ajudge in Delaware's Chancery Court, who previously ruled
in Louis Redding's favor in Parkerv. University ofDelaware,0 in which
he ordered the desegregation of the University of Delaware. As he had in
Parker,Judge Seitz personally visited the schools to compare them. In
both cases, experts presented extensive testimony concerning the negative
effects of segregation.'' Other evidence confirmed the physical inequality
of the schools.' °2
Judge Seitz concluded that he did not have the authority to overturn
Plessy, but he ruled that the black schools were inferior and, unlike the
trial judges in the other cases, Judge Seitz ordered the admission of the
black students to the white schools. 3 This was the only case in which the
plaintiffs prevailed at the trial court level.1 °4
VI. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ARGUMENTS AND DECISION

On December 9, 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court arguments commenced
in the six consolidated school desegregation cases. 0 5 After two exhausting
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 800.
87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
Id. at 863.
Id. at 869.
75 A.2d 225 (Del. 1950).
Belton, 87 A.2d at 864.
Id.at 866-67, 870.
Id. at 871.
See Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN VS. BOARD

OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA,

1952-55, at 11 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) (giving a transcript of the
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days, the arguments concluded on December 11, 1952. Several months
later, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order that set the cases over to the
next term for reargument. The Court directed the parties to submit briefs
addressing a series of questions concerning congressional intent in
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the Court questioned
how a desegregation order might be implemented if one were issued.'0 6
The order setting down a second argument was an unusual event. Some
of the NAACP attorneys took the order as a positive sign, while others
believed that it was an ominous signal. In the end, there was nothing they
could do except respond to the Court's questions. To research the original
intent of Congress, NAACP's legal director Marshall enlisted John A.
Davis, a professor of political science at Lincoln University. Davis
obtained the assistance of Horace Mann Bond, President of Lincoln
University. C. Vann Woodward, who later became one of the leading
authorities on the Reconstruction period, and John Hope Franklin, a
distinguished black historian, also assisted with the research. Also,
William Coleman, a young African-American attorney, who had graduated
first in his class at Harvard and clerked for Supreme Court
Justice Felix
10 7
Frankfurter, coordinated research in the various states.
During the next several months, the attorneys, historians, law
professors and others assisting the NAACP attorneys grappled with the
research concerning the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. They examined records in state archives. There were many
long days and nights of exhaustive work. In the end, the researchers were
unable to find any unequivocal evidence that directly addressed the court's
questions. Eventually, the attorneys settled on the argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit state-sponsored
segregation. They contended that Plessy rested on a false premise, and that
segregation was intended to perpetuate racial subordination rather than
some form of separate equality. Therefore, they argued that the separate
but equal doctrine was a pernicious legal fiction used to enforce a regime
of white supremacy.
John W. Davis and the other attorneys defending the Southern school
boards reached an entirely different conclusion, relying on, among other
things, evidence of segregated schools in the District of Columbia when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. They were encouraged by the

arguments in Brown); see also GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 168-75, 189-94; KLUGER, supranote
24, at 544-81, 667-78.
106. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
107. KLUGER, supra note 24, at 618-46; GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 177-89.
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court ordered decision for reargument. They believed that the historical
record and applicable legal precedent amply supported their position.
After months of anxious waiting, on December 7, 1953, the three days
of reargument commenced. This was a dramatic moment in the U.S.
Supreme Court's history. Spectators filled the courtroom. The crowd
flowed onto the steps outside of the U.S. Supreme Court building.
Reporters, attorneys, students, and ordinary citizens wanted to witness
what everyone knew would be an historic event. Segregation itself was on
trial. The proceedings commenced with the Briggs case.
The NAACP's attorneys argued that the Court should apply what
would become the "strict scrutiny" doctrine. 1 8 As Justice Marshall
explained in an article published shortly before the Supreme Court
arguments:
It is sometimes said then there is a presumption of
unconstitutionality running against governmental action based upon
race or color. This may be an overstatement of fact, but certainly
this type of governmental action in terms of motivation, purpose,
and effect is now subjected to a more searching scrutiny than is
ordinarily the case with other kinds of state activity.'0 9
Over the next two days, the Court heard arguments from the attorneys
representing the parties. The Court recessed on December 9, 1953. On
May 17, 1954, in front of a packed courtroom, Chief Justice Earl Warren
announced the decision in the school desegregation cases. The opinion in
Brown is notable, and controversial to some, for its brevity and simplicity.
There was no discussion of strict scrutiny or the relevant standard of
judicial review. The opinion was written in a straightforward style that
could be understood by lay readers. It began with a recitation of the history
of the cases from the trials to the arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court."1 0
The Court found that the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth

108. In Hirabayshiand Korematsu, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state actions creating
racial classifications must be subjected to the most exacting level of judicial scrutiny and held
unconstitutional, unless they are narrowly tailored and necessary to achieving a compelling state
objective. Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In the now discredited holdings on the merits, the Court found that the
wartime internment of Americans of Japanese ancestry based solely on race was justified. Id.
109. THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE SUPREME COURT AS PROTECTOR OF CIVIL RIGHTS: EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, ANNALS OF AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

275 (1951), reprintedin THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS
AND REMINISCENCES (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).
110. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,486-89 (1954).
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Amendment on the question of segregated schools was not clear."' The
Court then traced the evolution
of the separate but equal doctrine from
2
Plessy through McLaurin.l"
After emphasizing the importance of education in a democratic society,
the Court stated the issue as whether "segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race... deprives the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities.""' 3 The Court found that it did,
and concluded that "[t]o separate [black] children from others of similar
age and qualifications generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in ways unlikely
ever to be undone."' 14 Significantly, the Court held that "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.""' 5
VII. IMPLEMENTING BROWN'S MANDATE

The U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown did not address the
remedy. The cases were held over and reargued in 1955 to determine the
manner in which the Court's decision should be implemented. In the
Brown II decision, the Court remanded the cases to the trial courts and
ordered the school boards to proceed with "all deliberate speed""' 6 to
develop desegregation plans under the supervision of the local federal
courts. 17
The South's reaction was swift and severe. On March 12, 1956, The
Southern Manifesto was read into the Congressional Record." 8 This
document contained 96 signatures, 19 from the U.S. Senate and 77 from
the House of Representatives.ll 9 The Manifesto proclaimed "the Supreme
Court of the United States, with no legal basis for such action, undertook
to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal
political and social ideas for the established law of the land."' 2 It also
alleged that "outside agitators are threatening immediate and revolutionary
changes in our public school systems. If done, this is certain to destroy the
111. Id. at 489.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 493.
114. Id. at 494.
115. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
116. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
117. Id.
118. William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Courtby State Officials: A Case Study of Why
Court-CurbingMovements Fail,50 BuFF. L. REv. 483, 494 (2002).
119. Id.
120. 102 CONG. REC. 6821 (1956).
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system of public education in some of the states."'' The Manifesto
concluded with a pledge to "use all lawful means to bring about a reversal
the Constitution, and to
of the [Brown] decision, which is contrary to 122
implementation."'
its
in
force
of
use
the
prevent
The Manifesto set the stage for the South's response to Brown. School
boards engaged in tactics ranging from passive resistance to outright
defiance. Some elected officials took actions that lead to clashes between
state and federal authorities. One incident involved school desegregation
efforts in Little Rock, Arkansas. On May 20, 1954, the Little Rock School
Board issued a policy statement indicating its intent to comply with
' On May 24, 1955, a federal court in Little Rock approved a plan
Brown. 23
that anticipated desegregation in stages, to be completed by 1963.124 In
September 1957, nine black students were slated to enroll in Central High
School in Little Rock. 125 In September 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval
Faubus sent National Guard troops to Central High to prevent the students
from enrolling. 2 6 On September 3rd, the school board petitioned the
federal court for a two and one-half year delay in the implementation of
the plan. 127 The court refused the board's request and ordered it to proceed
with desegregation.' 28 On September 4th, National Guard troops blocked
the African-American students at the door of Central High School acting
on the Governor's order. 129 A local NAACP attorney, Wiley Branton, and
the NAACP legal director Marshall, sought relief in the federal court. On
September 20th, the court granted the NAACP's request for an injunction
to prevent Governor Faubus and the National Guard from interfering with
the black students' efforts to enroll in Central High. 30
On September 23rd, the students entered the school through a side door
to avoid a mob of angry whites that had gathered in front of the building
and were chanting racist epithets and threatening violence."'3 However, the
students were unable to complete the day because rioting broke out on the

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958).
124. Id.at 8.
125. Id.at 9.
126. Id.
127. Id.at 10-11.
128. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11.
129. Id.
130. GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 228-42 (Greenberg was an attorney at the NAACP's Legal
Defense Fund who succeeded Thurgood Marshall as the leader of that organization. Greenberg
argued the Delaware Brown cases and headed the LDF from 1961-1984).
131. Cooper,358 U.S. at 12.
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school grounds. 3 2 Reports of the confrontation at Little Rock generated
international newspaper headlines. Images of white mobs and armed
National Guard troops dominated nightly news reports. Television crews
filmed scenes showing dozens of angry white adults crowding around
young black students, uttering threats, and waving signs protesting the
integration.
Events rapidly escalated to a breaking point. On September 25th,
President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to Little Rock.
Eisenhower disagreed with the Brown decision and had not offered much
support for integration, but he viewed the actions of the Arkansas officials
as a challenge to his authority.133 When heavily armed federal troops
arrived in Little Rock in tanks and other military vehicles, the black
students were finally allowed to attend classes. On November 27, 1957,
Army troops were withdrawn although federalized National Guardsmen
remained on duty at Central High School throughout the school year.'34
The federal court's denial of the request to suspend the operation of the
school board's desegregation plan was appealed and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 3 5 That decision was appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.'3 6 In an opinion issued on September 29, 1958, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Cooperv. Aaron 1 7 reaffirmed Brown and strongly
condemned the actions of the Arkansas officials.' 38 The Court emphasized
that Article VI made the U.S. Constitution "the supreme law of the
land."' 3 9 The Court found that the actions of Arkansas' governor and state
legislature, who claimed that they were not bound by the Brown decision,0
were in direct conflict with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.14
It held that "no state legislature or executive judicial officer can war
against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support
it.... A governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court order is
similarly constrained.' 14' The Court concluded that the "principles
announced in [Brown] and the obedience of the states to them, according

132. Id.
133. Jack Greenberg, Brown v. Board of Education: An Axe in the Frozen Sea of Racism, 48
ST.Louis U. L.J. 869, 878 (2004).

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

supra note 24, at 228-42.
Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1958).
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to the command of the Constitution, are indispensable for the protection
'
of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us."142
Another widely publicized confrontation concerning integration
unfolded at the University of Mississippi. In 1961, James Meredith, a
Mississippi native and military veteran attempted to enroll at the
University of Mississippi.4 3 When his application was rejected, Meredith
wrote a letter to the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund asking them to file suit
seeking to compel his admission to the university.'" The NAACP agreed,
and it dispatched Legal Defense Fund staff attorney Constance Baker
Motley to lead the effort.'45 The NAACP lost at the lower court level. 14 6
The university disingenuously claimed Meredith's application had been
denied not because of his race, but because he had failed to submit the
required "alumni certificates," which were endorsements from university
graduates. 147 This would have been an impossible task for an AfricanAmerican in Mississippi in 1960. The trial judge accepted this
subterfuge.148 The ruling was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
appellate panel reversed the trial court and ordered
Fifth Circuit, where the 49
Meredith's admission.1

Not long after the Fifth Circuit issued its decision, Mississippi
Governor Ross Barnett announced his intention to defy the federal court
order invoking state sovereignty and "interposition."' 150 When Meredith
attempted to register for classes at the university, Governor Barnett refused
to allow him to enroll.' 5 ' The NAACP and the U.S. Department of Justice,
an intervener in the case, filed an application for contempt in the federal
proceeding seeking an order to require school officials to obey the ruling
requiring Meredith's admission. 5 2 On September 23rd, Meredith,

142. Id.at 18-19.
143.

EQUAL
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144. See GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 318-19; MOTLEY, supranote 143, at 162-63.

145. See GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 318-19; MOTLEY, supranote 143, at 162-92 (Motley,
now a U.S. District Court Judge, was an attorney with the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund before
her appointment to the bench, and was Meredith's lead counsel.).
146. See Meredith v. Fair, 199 F. Supp. 754, 757-58 (S.D. Miss. 1961); GREENBERG, supra
note 24, at 319; MOTLEY, supra note 143, at 163-69.
147. See Meredith, 199 F. Supp. at 755-56; GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 318; MOTLEY,
supra note 143, at 163.
148. See Meredith, 199 F. Supp. at 755-56; GREENBERG, supra note 24, at 319; MOTLEY,
supra note 143, at 169-70.
149. Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962); see GREENBERG, supranote 24, at 319-20.
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accompanied by federal marshals, attempted to enter the university.'53
State police and Mississippi's Lieutenant Governor again prevented
court issued
Meredith from registering.154 On September 28th, the federal
55
1
court.
of
contempt
in
Barnett
Governor
holding
order
an
U.S. Marshals and the Army Corps of Engineers were dispatched to
assist Meredith in his efforts to register.'56 Attorney General Robert
Kennedy engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiations with Governor
Barnett and other Mississippi officials in an effort to head off a violent
confrontation. 5 7 On September 29th, after negotiations failed Pesident
John F. Kennedy signed a Proclamation ordering federal troops to
Oxford. 58
' Subsequently, fourteen hundred federal troops arrived in Oxford
and escorted Meredith to a dormitory on the campus.'59 Hundreds of
whites gathered on the campus."6 Gunshots rang out.'61 A French reporter
was shot and killed in the fracas. 6 2 Shotgun pellets injured some of the
U.S. Marshals.'63 By 3:00 the next morning, more federal troops arrived. 1"4
Within a few hours twenty-five hundred armed federal soldiers occupied
the campus with tanks and other military vehicles.' 65
For several days, the events at Oxford dominated national news
reports.' 66 Television crews captured images of the violence, which were
broadcast to an international audience.' 67 Two weeks after the first riot,
Meredith was finally able to register for classes. 168 Federal troops, at times
numbering as many as twenty-three thousand, occupied the town of
Oxford. 69 The federal troops were gradually withdrawn, and the last five
hundred soldiers finally departed when Meredith graduated in 1963.170

153. See MOTLEY, supra note 143, at 182.
154. See id.
155. Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962); see GREENBERG, supranote 24, at 327-29;
MOTLEY, supra note 143, at 182.
156. See GREENBERG, supranote 24, at 330.
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Alabama also went to great lengths to avoid integration. A case seeking
to desegregate the University of Alabama, Lucy v. Alabama, 7 ' was filed
in 1953 and was still pending when the U.S. Supreme Court issued the
Brown decision in 1954. The NAACP lawyers subsequently reactivated
Lucy. The trial court ruled in the NAACP's favor' and on August 26,
1955, the lower court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.' When the plaintiff, Autherine Lucy, registered for
classes in 1956, a riot broke out on the campus.' As a result, the
university's trustees removed Lucy from the campus.' 75 The NAACP
76
subsequently sued to compel the trustees to allow Lucy to attend classes. 1
The court ruled that the university had not disobeyed the court's order to
allow Lucy to attend the university.7 The NAACP's efforts were
frustrated when
that ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
78
Fifth Circuit.
In 1963, another suit was brought against the University of Alabama
on behalf of two African-American students. 7 9 Post-Meredith, Alabama
officials knew that resistance would be futile. 8 °Governor George Wallace
reached an understanding with the U.S. Justice Department.' 8 ' Having
pledged to take a stand "at the schoolhouse door" to block the students'
admission, Governor Wallace was allowed to proceed with his pretense of
blocking the door and then stepping aside when the students and the
federal troops accompanying them arrived.'82 Wallace's staged resistance
made national news and propelled his political career, which was based
largely on his outspoken opposition to school desegregation.' 83
In the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions that were
intended to put an end to the South's massive resistance. In Griffin v.
County School Board of Prince Edward County, 184 a case in which the
school district involved in the original Brown cases had closed all of its
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schools to avoid desegregation,'85 Justice Hugo Black concluded that
"[t]here has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in
8 6 The Court
enforcing the constitutional rights which we held in Brown."'
187
schools.
its
ordered Prince Edward County to reopen
In Alexander v. Holmes County BoardofEducation,'88 the Court ruled
that the "continued operation of segregated schools under a standard
allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer
constitutionally permissible... the obligation of every school district is to
terminate dual school
systems at once and operate now and hereafter only
189
unitary schools.'

In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,'90 the Court
held that states that maintained segregated schools had an affirmative duty
to eradicate all vestiges of the formerly segregated system "root and
branch," and that school boards were obligated to bear the burden of
proving compliance with the new standard.' 9 '
Finally, in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoardofEducation,192 the
endorsed busing as a means of achieving racial
U.S. Supreme Court
93
balance in schools. 1
VIII. DEMOGRAPHICS AND DESEGREGATION

In the South, particularly in rural areas, school desegregation
commenced after Green. In districts where there were only one or two
high schools, the white and black high schools simply merged with all
students attending a single, racially integrated school. In urban areas,
however, demographic patterns made school desegregation far more
difficult.' 94 Beginning in the years during and after World War I, AfricanAmericans migrated in large numbers from rural areas in the South to
urban communities in the North and Midwest. 95 In 1940, seventy-seven

185. See id. at 220-22.
186. Id. at229.
187. Seeid. at 233-34.
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189. Id. at20.
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percent of African-Americans resided in southern states. 91 6 From 1910 to
1970 six and one-half million African-Americans relocated from the South
to the North.1 97 Lured by the availability of employment opportunities in
factories that paid far more than they could earn performing farm labor in
the South, African-Americans also sought to avoid the oppressive
conditions that existed in the South, where violence, lynching, and other
forms of intimidation were commonplace.' 9
During the years that African-American families were moving north,
whites were relocating from central city neighborhoods to the surrounding
suburbs.'9 9 This trend accelerated exponentially during the post-World
War II era, when the federal government heavily subsidized
homeownership with Federal Housing Administration and Veteran's
Administration mortgage programs.200 African-Americans, however, were
20
locked out of suburban areas as a result of racially restrictive covenants '
and other discriminatory practices. The federal government perpetuated
residential segregation by requiring racially restrictive covenants on
properties financed by government-insured mortgages.0 2 Local
governments intentionally located subsidized housing in all black or all
white neighborhoods to maintain segregation. 20 3 Exclusionary zoning
practices prohibited the construction of subsidized and multifamily
housing in many suburban communities. 2" By the late 1960s, cities in

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. LEON F. LITWAK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW
(1999).
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200. See id.
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violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,82 (1917). AfterBuchanan,
property owners resorted to private covenants to maintain segregated neighborhoods. The covenants
were deed restrictions that prevented homeowners from conveying their property to racial and
religious minorities. During the 1930s and 1940s, the NAACP mounted a litigation campaign
against restrictive covenants that culminated with the 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer which
held that lawsuits seeking to enforce discriminatory covenants constituted state action that violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948); see Leland B. Ware,
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Northern and Midwestern industrial centers became increasingly black,
while surrounding suburbs were virtually all white. 05
The impact of residential segregation on school desegregation was the
focus of Milliken v. Bradley,2°6 a case involving schools in Detroit,
Michigan. The plaintiffs in Milliken attempted to address residential
segregation by including the suburban school districts surrounding Detroit
in a metropolitan desegregation plan.20 7 As a consequence of racially
segregated housing patterns and "white flight" to suburban communities,
the schools in Detroit were rapidly shifting to predominately black
populations.20 ' At the same time, enrollments in suburban districts were
nearly all white.20 9 They argued that racial balance could not be achieved
without including the suburban districts in the desegregation plan.2 0 In an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Supreme Court held
that suburban school districts could not be required to participate in courtordered desegregation plans unless it could be proven that their actions
211
contributed to segregation in the jurisdiction in which the case arose.
There could be no busing across district lines without a showing of an
inter-district violation. With limited exceptions, suburban districts were
effectively insulated from the desegregation process.
Over the next few years, school desegregation proceeded slowly with
courts relying heavily on intra-district busing to achieve racial balance. 1
During the same period, residential segregation in inner city areas
increased substantially despite the anti-discrimination provisions of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968.213
However, in the early 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court's desegregation
jurisprudence took a dramatic shift. The decisions in Boardof Education
v. Dowell,2 4 Freemanv. Pitts,2 15 and Missouriv. Jenkins2 16 created amuch
lower standard for finding that a school system has achieved "unitary
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status," the ultimate goal of desegregation efforts.217 Under Green, school
districts were required to completely eradicate all remnants of the
segregated system "root and branch." The new standard requires only a
showing of good faith compliance with the original desegregation decree
and the elimination of most lingering vestiges.2 18 If student populations
reflect segregated housing patterns, school officials are not held
responsible.219 The new standard obligates courts to hold that the
desegregation requirement has been satisfied, even though most urban
school populations are largely black and Latino as a result of the
persistence of segregated housing patterns.22 °
The 2000 Census reveals that extremely high levels of residential
segregation persist.22 Researchers' definitions of residential integration
vary but, depending on the yardstick used, somewhere between 9 and 19
percent of America's neighborhoods are integrated.222 This means that
between 81 and 91 percent of Americans live in segregated communities.
This is not a consequence of private choice. Studies show that on average,
one in five African-Americans seeking housing can expect to encounter
some form of discrimination. 2 ' Hundreds of complaints are filed each year
with the federal, state, and local
fair housing enforcement agencies. An

217. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 83-89; Freeman,503 U.S. at 498-99; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 24950.
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unknown number of individuals who are the victims of discriminatory
treatment do not file complaints, because they are not aware that
discrimination has occurred. This happens because most of the
discrimination that occurs now is subtle or completely hidden.
One tactic is known as "steering," a practice in which realtors show
homes to African-Americans in black areas while white purchasers are
directed to white neighborhoods. 2 4 Data disclosed by lending institutions
showed that African-Americans' applications for mortgages are rejected
far more frequently than those of whites with comparable incomes and
credit histories. 225 Hispanics fare somewhat better than blacks, but not as
well as whites.226 In some cities, blacks who purchase homes in
predominantly black neighborhoods are not able to purchase homeowner's
insurance from mainstream companies. 22' At every level of a typical real
estate transaction, African-Americans and other minorities are likely to
receive treatment that is less favorable than similarly situated whites.
The assumption that underlies the return to neighborhood schools is
that housing patterns reflect the location preferences of individual families
and any segregation that results is a product of private choice. Contrary to
this belief, however, African-Americans and nonwhite Hispanics have not
had the range of housing choices available to whites with comparable
incomes and credit histories.2 28 Their options are limited by an array of
discriminatory practices in the nation's housing markets.2 2 9 This unlawful
conduct perpetuates the residential segregation that began in the Jim Crow
era when public policies and private practices kept blacks out of white
neighborhoods. The end of busing and the return to neighborhood schools
means that schools will be as segregated as the communities in which they
are located. Public schools have been resegregating steadily since the
1990s, when Dowell, Freeman and Jenkins were decided.23" Therefore,
224. Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553,556-57 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (steering involves actions
by real estate brokers or agents intended to influence the choice of a prospective home buyer on
racial basis).
225. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA [hereinafter WHAT WE KNOW], available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/fairhsg/lending.html (last visited Mar. 14,2005); U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT

REPORT (June 2000) [hereinafter A JOINT REPORT], available at http://www.huduser.org/
publications/hsgfin/curbing.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
226. See WHAT WE KNOW, supra note 225; A JOINT REPORT, supra note 225.
227. See WHAT WE KNOW, supra note 225; A JOINT REPORT, supra note 225.
228. See WHAT WE KNOW, supra note 225; A JOINT REPORT, supra note 225.
229. See WHAT WE KNOW, supra note 225; A JOINT REPORT, supra note 225.
230. See generally GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE

QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.BOARD OFEDUCATION(1996); LEWIS MUMFORD CTR., CHOOSING
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housing discrimination has effectively thwarted school desegregation.
Black students in many of America's inner cities are as segregated now as
231
their grandparents were in the pre-Brown era.
IX. REASSESSING BRo wN's LEGACY
The Brown decision has long been controversial in academic circles.
A few years after the case was decided, Professor Herbert Wechsler, a
prominent legal scholar, published a critique in which he argued that the
findings of psychological harm that were central to Brown undermined its
credibility as a case supported by solid legal analysis and reasoning.232 In
Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, Wechsler argued that
Brown was not decided on the facts presented, but on the Court's
conclusion that segregation denied equal rights for African-Americans.233
Wechsler believed that the critical but unresolved legal issue in Brown
involved the associational right of whites.234 Wechsler stated that "if the
freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an
235
association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.,
Wechsler concluded that there was no neutral legal principle which
supported the Court's ruling in Brown.236
In 1958, a distinguished and widely respected jurist, Learned Hand,
criticized the Brown decision in a lecture delivered at Harvard
University.237 Hand argued that the Warren Court's activism undermined
the political process by substituting the Court's judgments for the will of
the people.238 Hand believed that judicial review "should be confined to
occasions when the statute or order was outside the grant of power to the
grantee, and should not include a review of how the power has been
exercised."239

SEGREGATION: RACIAL IMBALANCE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1990-2000 (Jan. 18, 2002)
[hereinafter CHOOSING SEGREGATION], available at http://mumfordl.dyndns.org/cen2000/

report.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
231. See generally ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 230; CHOOSING SEGREGATION, supranote
230.
232. See generally Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73
HARv. L. REV. 1-5 (1959).
233. See id. at 32-33.
234. See id. at 34-35.
235. Id. at 34.
236. Id. at 34-35.
237. See generally LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).

238. See generally id.
239. See generally id.
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Philip Elman was Justice Felix Frankfurter's law clerk and an attorney
in the Solicitor General's Office from 1944 to 1961 .240 Elman handled
several Supreme Court civil rights cases and contributed to the Solicitor
General's brief in Brown.24 ' In an interview published in the HarvardLaw
Review, Elman claimed that the NAACP won Brown despite making "the
wrong arguments at the wrong time in the wrong cases. 2 42 Elman asserted
that Brown would have come out the
same way had Marshall stood up and
243
recited, "Mary had a little lamb.

More recently, in Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights
Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy, Professor James T. Patterson
examined the history of the NAACP's struggle against segregated schools,
Southern whites' resistance to desegregation efforts, the busing
controversy, and the mixed views of racial progress in the decades after
Brown.24 Patterson pointed to the trend toward resegregation, the
persistent achievement gap between black and white students, and the
mood of pessimism245 among many African-Americans as Brown's
disappointing legacy.

In From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and Racial
Equality,246 Professor Michael Klarman examined the impact of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions on race relations. Klarman concluded that
Brown radicalized the political climate in the South, which led to the era
of massive resistance orchestrated by segregationist politicians. 47 The
reaction resulted in violent confrontations like those in Little Rock and
Oxford. 248 Klannan argued that change would have resulted without Brown
in a more gradual manner but in ways that would have had wider
acceptance among southern whites.24 9
Some of Brown 's most outspoken critics are on the left wing of the
ideological perspective. Professor Derrick Bell has long been critical of

240. Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The SolicitorGeneral'sOffice, JusticeFrankfurter,and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 817 n.al (1987).

241. See generally id.
242. Id. at 837.
243. Id. at 852.
244. See generally JAMEs T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIvIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001).
245. See id. at 206-23.
246. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROWTO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).

247. See id. at 443-68.
248. See id.

249. See id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

civil rights lawyers' tactics in school desegregation cases.25 ° In Silent
Covenants, Bell took his criticisms a step further when he argued that
Brown was wrongly decided."' Bell claimed that African-American
students would have fared better had the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed
Plessy in Brown and ordered the states to equalize the black and white
schools.2 52 Had the Court done so, Bell argued, black students would have
received instruction in facilities that were physically on par with white
schools with equal financial and other resources and parents would have
participated in governance by serving on school boards.253 Bell suggested
that high-quality instruction in an all black environment would be
preferable to what has happened to black students in the years that
followed the Brown decision.254
There may be merit to some of the arguments made by Brown's critics,
but most of the blame has been misdirected. The graduate school cases
leading up to Brown pursued an equalization strategy. The cases filed
against universities argued the black and white schools should be
equalized, but stopped short of a direct challenge to Plessy's separate but
equal rationale. After a series of victories in the U.S. Supreme Court, a
direct challenge was finally launched in Brown. The premise of the
equalization strategy was factual: black and white schools were separate
but not equal; and the facilities and other resources in black schools were
demonstrably inferior to those in white schools.
The strategy evolved in Sweatt and MeLaurin when the NAACP
attorneys persuaded the Supreme Court to recognize that racial isolation
inhibited black students' ability to learn. Therefore, even if the black and
white schools were physically and otherwise equal, the educational
experience would not be the same. In the Brown cases, Dr. Kenneth Clark
and other expert witnesses described the stigmatic injuries that segregation
inflicted. The U.S. Supreme Court's critical finding in Brown "that
separating black children from others of similar age and qualification
' was correct.
generates a feeling of inferiority"255
The difficulties with school desegregation resulted from the ways in
which Brown was interpreted, its faulty implementation, and the
250. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and Client Interests in
School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
251. See generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.BOARD OF EDUCA TION AND
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 130-37 (2004).

252.
253.
254.
255.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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persistence of high levels of residential segregation. School desegregation
has been measured almost entirely in terms of racial balance in individual
schools rather that the quality of instruction provided to black students.
Busing has been the principal means of achieving racial balance. The
reliance on bussing sends a mixed message. Black students are bused from
their inner city neighborhoods, and they are bused from "bad" schools to
"good" schools in the suburbs. Neglect and lack of resources reflected in
inner city neighborhoods are not the same as inherent inferiority, but the
distinction is not always clear to everyone. An implicit message of black
inferiority can be an unintended consequence.
Conditions for black students in racially mixed schools are not always
good. Despite changes in racial composition, suburban schools have not
altered their instructional methods to accommodate the attitudes,
perspectives, and cultural references ofAfrican-American students. School
curricula reflect a traditional, Eurocentric paradigm that implicitly
devalues the contributions of African-Americans.256 Black children are
expected to assimilate values and perspectives that sometimes conflict
with their personal backgrounds and experiences.
Brown reflected an assimilationist vision of America. Under the classic
model of immigrant assimilation, the expectation was that after arriving in
the United States, immigrant groups of subordinate status would change
and become more like the culturally dominant group over successive
generations. The descendants of immigrants were deemed fully assimilated
when they fit into the main stream of the dominant society without
encountering prejudice or discrimination as a result of their ethnic or
cultural ancestry. Success in educational institutions and elsewhere
requires African-Americans to assimilate standards, attitudes, and
behaviors that may be awkward and foreign to them, but normal and
acceptable to the majority community. "Code switching" is one means of
adapting, but it requires African-Americans to become cultural
chameleons. At work or at school, speech patterns, clothing styles and
body language allow blacks to fit into the dominant culture. At home and
in other settings, many blacks revert to the dress, speech patterns, and
other cultural norms of the communities in which they reside. Not all
blacks are willing or able to code switch. "Keeping it real," resistance to
"acting white," and other more extreme forms of oppositional behavior are
reflections of this trend.

256. See Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes
Createdby Legal ConceptualizationofRace andPublicEducation, 78 IOWA L. REv. 813, 814-17
(1993).
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By characterizing the effects of segregation as damaging to only to
black students, Brown reinforced stereotypes of black inferiority. White
schools were deemed valuable; black institutions were inferior. Brown was
interpreted to require a one-way assimilation of blacks into white
institutions, instead of changing those institutions in ways that would make
them open and welcoming environments for everyone. This has led some
African-Americans to reject integrationism. 2" For instance, there are
affluent, all black suburbs in areas in several cities.258 Examples of this
trend can be found in neighborhoods in or around Atlanta, Georgia and
Washington, D.C. 259 In these communities black professionals and
entrepreneurs reside in luxurious homes. 26' For them, proximity to whites
is not necessary to their well-being.
Professor Sheryll Cashin describes this trend as "integration
exhaustion." 261 However, separatist sentiments among African-Americans
are not entirely voluntary. Some of it is attributable to deterrence. Many
blacks do not want to be isolated as the "only one" in areas without a
critical mass of other blacks. They do not want to be the victims of racial
profiling while driving home from work; nor do they wish for their
children to attend schools in environments that are not welcoming and
nurturing. Whites with comparable incomes and educational backgrounds
do not have these concerns.
Private and charter schools featuring afrocentric curricula and singlesex schools for black males reflect the separatist sentiment.2 62 Some of this
represents a nostalgic view of a time when black teachers in segregated
schools nurtured their students, stressed academic excellence, and
performed admirably with the limited resources that were available. PreBrown enclaves of black excellence, such as the District of Columbia's
Dunbar High School,26 3 were rare then and cannot be replicated today.
Instead, today's inner city students suffer from high levels of concentrated
poverty, institutional neglect, and extreme isolation.
Racism has not abated. It has merely become more covert, more
indirect, and less conscious, but no less effective in generating

257. CASHIN, supranote 222.
258. See generally Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and Suburbia:The Modern Black Suburb
as a "Race-Making Situation," 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749 (2002).

259. See generally id. (Examining suburbanization patterns in Prince George's County,
Maryland and south DeKalb, Georgia).
260. See generally id.
261. CASHIN, supra note 222.
262. See Brown, supra note 256, at 849-52.
263. See generally MARY GIBsON HUNDLEY, THE DUNBAR STORY(1967); CONSTANCE GREEN,
THE SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS INTHE NATION'S CAPITAL 185,290 (1967).
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disadvantage for persons of color. It reasserts itself in coded forms that
create disproportionately negative outcomes for African-Americans and
other people of color. The critical issues now concern the quality of
instruction that minority students receive in public schools and attitudes
of those who teach them. There are substantial and persistent performance
disparities between black and white students no matter where their schools
are located. 2' The average test scores and educational attainment levels for
black students are far below white averages.265 The focus must remain on
eliminating this achievement gap. Public institutions must be held to their
obligation to provide the same quality of instruction to all students, rather
than acting on unconscious and often explicit assumptions about the
learning abilities of black students.

X. CONCLUSION
266
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Boardof Education
was probably the most important ruling of the twentieth century. One of
the most remarkable aspects of Brown was the success of the individuals
who made it possible. A small group of under-resourced attorneys
prevailed against formidable opponents.267 When Charles Houston joined
the NAACP in 1935, he commenced the legal campaign without a staff
and with a budget often thousand dollars. With little more than vision and
his remarkable legal skills, Houston set out to change the prevailing legal
order. In the 1930s and 1940s, there were no provisions for awarding
attorney fees to prevailing parties. The African-Americans attorneys who
served as the NAACP's cooperating attorneys lived and worked in
segregated communities, and they often handled civil rights cases without
compensation. Rarely have so few accomplished as much with such
limited resources.
The significance of Brown cannot be underestimated, but the efforts to
implement the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate have been thwarted by
decades of delay and shifting demographics. After a generation of
progress, an increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court has

264. See generally David J. Armor, Desegregationand Academic Achievement, in SCHOOL
147-87 (Christine H. Rossell et al. eds., 2002). While there
have been some gains, decades of school desegregation has failed to make a substantial impact on
the academic performance disparities between black and white students, even in racially balanced
schools. See generally id.
265. See generally id.
266. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
267. See generally GREENBERG, supranote 24.
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consistently viewed civil rights cases with reluctance and skepticism. With
limited exceptions, the Court has ruled against civil rights claimants for
more than a decade. A change in direction is unlikely under the Court's
current composition. Despite this discouraging trend, conditions in 2004
are not what they were in 1954. Equality has not been achieved, but the
circumstances of most African-Americans are considerably better now
than they were in the years before Brown was decided. We can celebrate
Brown while recognizing that fifty years later its promise of racial equality
has not been fulfilled.

